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Abstract
 Through dialogue with three philosophers and theologians, Luigi 
Pareyson, Emmanuel Levinas, and Hans Urs von Balthasar, the 
paper seeks to answer four questions: 1) Is spiritual life art? 2) Is 
art communication with transcendence? 3) Is communication with 
transcendence revelation of the absolute? 4) Is revelation of the ab-
solute communion with pain? The paper claims that 1) spiritual life 
is, in a certain sense, art because it bears an aesthetic character; 
because it is an exercise in “formativity”: as a result, organism, and 
model; 2) if spiritual life is art and if art is formativity, the infini-
tude of transcendence does not shine from the beauty of a façade, 
a painting, or a statue, but from the beauty of a face, a human face 
whose opposition with mine, established by language, does not im-
pose a form on me, but elicits freedom of my goodness, gift, and 
hospitality; 3) if spiritual life is an exercise in formativity and if 
communication is the lieu where form is transcended into visage 
and offers a glimpse of infinitude, such transcendent infinitude and 
infinite transcendence can manifest themselves only as transparen-
cy, as light that shines through the veil of language and communica-
tion, as revelation; 4) it is on the basis of this aesthetic-theological 
discourse that one can reject not only the an-aesthetics but also the 
1 The first version of this paper was presented at the symposium “Beauty, the Color 
of Truth”, May 29–June 1, 2008, Jesuit School of Theology, Graduate Theological 
Union, Berkeley, organized by Alex Garcia Rivera. I thank Alex and my colleagues 
and friends at the GTU for their comments.
 I would like to dedicate this paper to Alex Garcia Rivera (1951–2010), who de-
voted his entire life to the pursuit of beauty, justice, and truth.
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an-aesthesia of evil, fight against one’s own acquiescence to it, and 
see the suffering face of the Other as the truthful revelation of the 
absolute, as the most precious occasion of communion with tran-
scendence, and as a call for truth, goodness, and beauty.
1  Introduction: The Veil of Maya as an Archetype
 in the Metaphysical Iconography of the Absolute
Throughout human history, philosophers, artists, and spiritual people 
of all sorts have striven to conceive the absolute, meant as dimension 
immune from the limited nature of the human existential experience (Eco, 
2008). However, since the conception of the absolute did not consist in its 
manifestation in the human dimension, but in the human imagination of 
it, philosophers, artists, and spiritual people of all sorts had to coat their 
conceptions of the absolute with images that were not themselves absolute, 
but a product of the limited nature of the human existential experience 
itself. From the point of view of cultural semiotics, these attempts to con-
ceive and imagine the absolute constitute a corpus of textual patterns, nar-
rative devices, and socio-cultural phenomena that semiotics can ob serve, 
describe, analyse, and categorise into types (Leone, 2010).
 The present paper claims that human conception and imagination of 
the absolute has brought about a metaphysical iconography that, with 
few exceptions, mostly falls into one, broad category, which can be ten-
tatively called “the category of the veil of maya”. “Maya”, which in 
Sans krit literally means “not that”, is one of the fundamental ideas in the 
metaphysics of Indian religions (Dasgupta, 1955: 1; De, 1982; Hager, 
1983; Braue, 1984; Tuck, 1986; Gengnagel, 1996). The semantics of this 
word is extremely vague, since it has been shaped by myriads of spiritual 
texts and commentaries. However, at the core of such a semantic cloud 
lies the concept that the duality that the human conscience detects in every 
manifestation of reality is just apparent – “it is not that”, one could say 
–, since all these manifestations are a dualistic veil of appearance hiding 
the truthful unity of the whole. Spiritual reflection therefore aims at en-
couraging humans to pierce such a veil and its discontent in order to merge 
with the absolute beyond it. In other words, according to the pre domi-
nant conceptual iconography of the absolute, the absolute is one, since the 
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presence of another being would inevitably entail a limitation of the ab-
solute, and therefore its submission to the idea of otherness.
 Such a metaphysical trend is not only a characteristic of “Eastern 
spirituality” but it also affects the spirituality of the “West”. Arthur Scho-
penhauer’s philosophy of the absolute and his adoption of the Indian 
metaphor of the “veil of maya” represent the clearest intersection in the 
convergence between the “East” and the “West” (Berger, 2004). To give 
another example – one that might be closer to the sensibility of contem-
po rary semioticians – although the epistemology of structuralism does 
not concern metaphysical noumena, since that which semioticians and 
other structuralist thinkers are about is mostly the elaboration of a rational 
meta-discourse on phenomena, the imaginaire of semiotics is not immune 
from the above-mentioned iconography of the absolute. Greimas, for 
instance — not only in the “mystical” essay on imperfection (Greimas, 
1987), but also in the conception of the semiotics of passion (Greimas 
and Fontanille, 1991), and even in that of structural semantics (Greimas, 
1966) — conceives semantic phenomena as waves that, through complex 
dynamics that semioticians must investigate, ripple the surface of an ocean 
of meaning mostly imagined as whole, undetermined, and absolute.
 In the present paper, I would like to underline that such metaphysical 
iconography of the absolute is not without ethical consequences. Expelling 
dualism and otherness from the metaphysical core of the human conception 
and imagination of the absolute brings about a certain disaffection for 
others’ pain. Relying on a different philosophical and spiritual trend, this 
paper will therefore try to explore an alternative metaphysical iconography 
of the absolute, one in which, paradoxically, the absolute is not imagined as 
one, or as an oxymoron where the duality of appearance is compressed into 
unity, or as unattainable nirvana lying beyond a veil of appearance. On the 
contrary, the paper will investigate a metaphysical tradition that, imagining 
the absolute according to a different semiotics, places at the core of the 
human experience of the absolute not unity but duality, not the ecstatic 
bliss of nirvana but the empathic awareness of pain, not metaphysical 
solipsism but sacrifice.
 Such alternative metaphysical iconography of the absolute will be 
evoked in response to the following four questions: 1) Is spiritual life art? 
2) Is art communication with transcendence? 3) Is communication with 
trans cendence revelation of the absolute? 4) Is revelation of the absolute 
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communion with pain? The present paper will try to give answers to these 
four questions through dialogue with three philosophers and theologians: 
Luigi Pareyson2, Emmanuel Levinas3, and Hans Urs von Balthasar4.
2  Luigi Pareyson: Spiritual Life and Formativity
Luigi Pareyson’s works have not been translated into English; Anglophone 
scholars are rarely familiar with them. Yet, he is one of the most important 
Italian continental philosophers of the twentieth century. As professor in 
the Department of Philosophy at the University of Turin for most of his life, 
he devoted his efforts to a reformulation of aesthetics, a reinterpretation 
of existentialism, and a re-foundation of religious hermeneutics (Tomatis, 
1998, 2003). His intellectual legacy is enshrined in several groundbreaking 
books and also lives through the many Italian intellectuals he mentored: 
some of them, such as Umberto Eco and Gianni Vattimo, have reached 
international acclaim (Gubatz, 2007, 2009).
 In 1953, at a congress on “Aesthetics and Christianity”, Luigi Pareyson, 
a Catholic thinker, presented a paper on “Art and Life” (Pareyson, 1953). 
According to this paper, a double relation emerges between art, meant as 
a specific and determined operation, and life, meant as the complex of all 
human activities: on the one hand, the whole life prepares art, so that an 
aesthetic character inheres in all its manifestations. Moreover, it is exactly 
in the act through which art is specified as a distinct operation that the 
whole life penetrates into it, so that art can become a reason of life for 
the human being who exerts or contemplates it. Spiritual life prepares art: 
according to Pareyson’s paper, this affirmation can only be understood if 
the distinction between “aesthetic sphere” and “artistic sphere” is kept in 
mind. The whole spiritual life is aesthetic in all its manifestations, while 
“artistic” is an attribute that pertains only to art in the proper sense.
 As a consequence, other forms of beauty lie beyond the artistic one, 
although they are not a result of artistic activity stricto sensu. In these 
cases, Pareyson’s paper continues, people define as “beautiful” what is 
“well done”, what is done according to the way required by the particular 
2 Piasco (Cuneo, Italy), 1918 – Rapallo, 1991.
3 Kaunas (Lithuania), 1906 – Paris, 1995.
4 Lucerne, 1905 – Basel, 1988.
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operation that is done. More precisely, beautiful is what brings about in 
a determined case the concept itself of the operation that is being done; 
that which is done in the only way in which, in the very determined 
circumstance, the thing had to be done, that is, the way that one would 
gladly imagine as typical, exemplary, and paradigmatic. Pareyson’s paper 
proposes several examples: a beautiful argument is a well constructed 
one, able to conclude in the way that reason requires in a given case; a 
beautiful solution succeeds in enunciating what reason itself demanded in 
order to resolve a determined problem; a beautiful demonstration enfolds 
according to reason and follows the logical order without deviations, able 
to reconcile simplicity and completeness in wise equilibrium, and bearing 
some particular qualities of elegance, the elegance that mathematicians are 
particularly worried about and jealous of.
 The beauty of one’s carriage, the beauty of one’s conversation, the 
beauty of moral life, the beauty of fabricated objects: Pareyson’s paper 
claims that in all these cases beauty appears as the result of a well done 
operation. People define as beautiful what is well done because doing 
actually is shaping, that is, doing which does not limit itself to execute 
something that is already established or to apply a technique that is already 
predisposed but a way of doing that, in the act of doing itself, also invents 
a way of doing, not only productive but also inventive doing, not only 
executing but also figuring doing. According to Pareyson’s paper, the result 
of doing meant as shaping is form, so that beauty is nothing but form, form 
as form. Not in the sense that beauty is one of the attributes of form, but in 
the sense that form in itself is beautiful and its beauty exactly consists in its 
being form.
 In the second part of his paper, Pareyson dwells on the characters of 
form: form is result, organism, and model. First, form is result because 
it is the result of an attempt, and an attempt is never sure of its good 
outcome but is always exposed to the danger of failure. Result to be such 
must appear as a happy resolution of attempts always exposed to failure. 
Second, form is organism because, as result, it lives its own life, without 
depending on anything external to it. Form has its own purpose and its 
own perfection in itself. Form is therefore “unitotality”, indissoluble and 
governed by an inner “organic law”, not sum of parts but an indivisible 
whole. Finally, form is model because the inventive energy through which 
form succeeds in overcoming the threat of failure intrinsic to the attempts 
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that produce it still acts after its results, attracting prosecutions, imitations, 
and developments. Such is the answer to the first question: spiritual life is, 
in a certain sense, art because it bears an aesthetic character, because it is 
exercise of “formativity”: as result, organism, and model.5
3  Emmanuel Levinas: Formativity and Visage
Emmanuel Levinas does not need any introduction. He is one of the most 
prominent philosophers of the twentieth century. All his works have been 
translated into English and are well known to scholars all over the world. In 
Totalité et infini, Essai sur l’exteriorité (1961), Levinas suggests that things 
are hidden under form. He develops this thought through a comparison 
between the concept of façade and that of face. It is art, he writes, that lends 
to things a sort of façade, that through which objects are not only seen but 
exhibit themselves. The obscurity of matter would therefore be the state of 
being that does not have any façade. From this point of view, the concept 
of façade, borrowed from buildings, might suggest that architecture is 
the foremost of fine arts. Yet, Levinas continues, in architecture beauty is 
constituted as that whose essence is indifference, cold splendour, and silence. 
Through a façade, the thing that keeps its secret exposes itself imprisoned 
in its monumental essence and myth, where it shines as splendour, but does 
not deliver itself. Then, according to Levinas’s argument, if transcendence 
is opening par excellence, and if vision of transcendence is vision of the 
opening itself of being, transcendence cannot be viewed as façade, but as 
visage.
 For Levinas, visage is both a phenomenological and an ethical concept. 
In visual or tactile sensation, one’s identity envelops the otherness of the 
object, which therefore becomes content, hidden behind form. A visage, 
instead, is present in its refusal to be contained. The Other remains infinitely 
transcendent, but language presents this transcendence as epiphany of 
visage. For Levinas, language therefore is the power itself that breaks 
the continuity of being and history. The formal structure of language, its 
capacity to constitute the Other as visage, as interlocutor, announces the 
ethic inviolability of the Other, its “sanctity”. This is what Levinas names 
5 Cf. also Pareyson, 1947, 1954. The secondary literature on the aesthetics of Parey-
son is quite extensive; cf. Finamore, 1999, and Caneva, 2008.
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“wel come of the visage”: the idea of transcendence, of infinitude is pro-
duced in opposition to discourse, in sociality. The relation with visage, with 
the ab solutely Other that one cannot contain, with the infinite Other, is, 
never theless, one’s idea, it is commerce. Yet, such a relation is maintained 
with out violence, in peace with the absolute Otherness.
 The first revelation of the Other, Levinas concludes, does not consist in 
seizing its negative resistance, in circumventing it by ruse. Je ne lutte pas 
avec un dieu sans visage, mais réponds à son expression, à sa révélation. 
I do not fight against a faceless god, but respond to its expression, to its 
re ve lation. If, as Pareyson would say, beauty is form, according to Levinas 
mani festing oneself as visage is imposing oneself beyond a manifested and 
purely phenomenical form, it is presenting oneself in a way that is not 
reducible to manifestation, without intermediation of any image, in one’s 
nudity, in one’s hunger. And if beauty is splendour that shines unknown to 
the shining being, what is provoked by the imposition of being as visage is 
not beauty but goodness, not re-presentation but responsibility. This is the 
answer to the second question: if spiritual life is art, and if art is formativity, 
the infinitude of transcendence does not shine from the beauty of a façade, 
a painting, or a statue, but from the beauty of a face, a human face whose 
opposition to mine, established by language, does not impose a form on 
me, but elicits the freedom of my goodness, my gift, and my hospitality.6
4  Hans Urs von Balthasar: Visage and Revelation
Hans Urs von Balthasar does not need any introduction either. In “Wahrheit 
der Welt”, first volume of “Theologik”, he proposes a conception of truth, 
beauty, and goodness that seems to resonate, in many regards, with Levinas’ 
conception of visage (von Balthasar, 1985). The religious backgrounds of 
the two philosophers are different, Jewish in case of Levinas, Catholic in 
that of Balthasar. Yet, they are inspired by similar philosophical trends and 
reach comparable conclusions.
 Truth is recurrently defined by Balthasar as disclosure of being. Just as 
in Levinas, though, so also in “Wahrheit der Welt” such an opening is not 
an “opening in itself”, unrelated, but an “opening for”, an accessibility, 
6 Literature on Levinas is extensive. As a useful point of departure, cf. Burggraeve, 
1990.
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with the implicit importance of an offer that is made. Balthasar tries to 
demonstrate that the subject, to whom this opening refers, is immediately 
an interlocutor, so that truth is both immanent in the opened object and 
includes a transcendent relation of knowledgeableness for the Other.
 Furthermore, in Balthasar, truth is intertwined with goodness: if truth is 
disclosure for, then truth intrinsically is communication, wherein Balthasar 
distinguishes between the communicating, which corresponds to the 
ground of being, the communicated, which corresponds to the being as 
ap pearing, and communication itself, which corresponds to the movement 
from the ground to the phenomenon. According to Balthasar, it is only 
through communication that what exists realises its worth and succeeds in 
know ing its own face not as something alien, as something attributed to it 
from the outside, as façade, as Levinas would say, but as its own essential 
iden tity. Through the same movement of communication, Balthasar con-
tinues, being relinquishes the avarice of being-only-for-itself in order to 
disclose itself and communicate, so receiving through this original re-
nuncia tion its weight as goodness, its unrepeatable worth. Given this co-
incid ence between truth and goodness, beauty for Balthasar is nothing but 
the immediate emergence of every being paradoxically grounded in its 
ground less ground. It is transparency, through every phenomenon, of the 
arcane ground of being.
 According to Balthasar, such intertwining and fundamental superposition 
of truth, goodness, and beauty therefore demonstrates that everything is 
comprehensible and revealed only insofar as it is grounded in an ultimate 
mystery, whose character of mysteriousness does not consist in lack of 
clearness but, on the contrary, in superabundance of light. But if truth, 
good ness, and beauty emerge as transparency, as revelation, this implies 
that things are, always and until the end, essentially veiled. Their being 
veiled means, according to Balthasar, a delimitation of their unveiling, of 
their truth. Veiling indeed, Balthasar continues, is not simply opposed to 
unveiling like an external barrier, but rather like a form or like a property 
inherent in unveiling itself.
 Reformulating this idea through concepts and terms elaborated by 
Pareyson, Levinas, and Balthasar, one might say that form is veil under 
which the truth, goodness, and beauty of visage are hidden, yet this veiling 
is necessary to unveiling, since revelation is not simply removal of the veil 
from the superabundant, transcendent, and infinite light of the visage, but 
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also re-veiling, transparency that can be perceived as such only insofar as 
it is light which transpires through a veil.7
 In “Ontology of Freedom” (Ontologia della libertà), Pareyson meditates 
on the dialectics between veiling and unveiling in the hermeneutics of 
religious experience (1995). According to Pareyson, if God is so trans-
cendent that humans cannot keep living after having seen his face, this 
is so because God has a face, which he offers, shows, and reveals or, on 
the contrary, withdraws, hides and conceals. Pareyson quotes a series of 
Biblical passages where transcendence is described as manifesting itself 
through a paradoxical dialectics between veiling and unveiling. Never-
theless, he rejects the validity of any attempt at de-mythologizing and re-
placing this imaginative language, which is eloquent insofar as it is myth-
ical and symbolical.
 According to Pareyson, indeed, an expression that aims at divesting 
itself as much as possible of the poetic and anthropomorphic character, 
so claiming to succeed in seizing divinity and showing its nature, runs 
the risk of being the least revealing for – and here Pareyson seems to 
echo Balthasar’s intuition – does not succeed in penetrating the dialectics 
through which God, in his “inexorable and impervious transcendence”, 
hides, and by hiding reveals himself, and does not reveal himself if not by 
hiding, so that about every manifestation of His, one must say that He veils 
in the act of un-veiling and vice versa, but one cannot say that He discloses 
more than He hides, neither that He conceals more than He shows.
 This is the answer to the third question: if spiritual life is an exercise in 
formativity and if communication is the lieu where form is transcended into 
visage and offers a glimpse of infinitude, such transcendent infinitude, such 
infinite transcendence can manifest itself only as transparency, as light that 
shines through the veil of language and communication, as revelation.
5  The Absolute as Suffering Otherness
The photograph showed on the next page was taken in 2005 by Francine Orr 
in Saint Joseph Hospital, at Kitgum, Uganda. It pictures Lokeria Aciro, a 
forty-year-old woman. A refugee in a camp for internally displaced people. 
7 Among the countless scholarly contributions on Balthasar, a good starting point is 
Howsare, 2009.
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One day she moved outside its borders in order to look for firewood. 
Suddenly, she was caught by an incursion of a local guerrilla group, para-
doxically called Lord’s Resistance Army, and attacked by a fighter who cut 
off her lips and ears with a machete. The most horrifying element of this 
episode is that the aggressor was eleven years old.
 According to reports of international human rights observers and activ-
ists, LRA fighters often maim the face of their victims, children frequently 
being among the most brutal perpetrators of such tortures. Given the 
systematic character with which these mutilations are inflicted, it is argued 
that they are part of a repertory of brutalities handed down within the LRA 
from generation to generation of fighters, through rituals of initiation to 
violence in which violence itself plays an essential role, brutalities that 
aim at preserving the LRA’s capacity to strike terror into North Uganda 
inhabitants (Leone, 2008).
 There is no time to evoke the tragic geopolitical background of this 
violence, nor to outline a cultural history, phenomenology, or semiotics 
of mutilation. It is evident, though, that in this case its purpose is not only 
the terror of the victim, but also that of the community to which the victim 
belongs. It is for this reason that the victim is not killed. It is for this reason 
that the most visible parts of her face are maimed. Cutting off lips and ears 
turns the face of the victim into a mute message of terror circulating in the 
community, a message in which the feeling of atrocious physical pain is 
paralleled by that of an equally devastating psychological suffering, caused 
by the de-facement of the victim but also by the consequent incapacity of 
expressing this pain through speech. The face, bereft of any physiognomy, 
of any form, of any humanity, disruptively evokes the idea of naked life at 
the disposal of a child whom violence transforms into a monster, the idea 
of homo sacer, as Giorgio Agamben (1995) would say.
 Creating the cultural, social, and political conditions thanks to which 
this violence might cease is beyond the capacities of theological dis-
course. Victims of Uganda, as well as victims of Sudan, Afghanistan, or 
Bur ma, just to mention a few of the many places where human suffering 
is currently omnipresent, do not primarily need aesthetic theology but a 
firm commitment of the international community. Yet, it is hard to believe 
that this commitment will be possible without being inspired, brought 
about, fostered, and guided by a certain idea of humanity, an idea that, 
like Pareyson, recognises that spiritual life must pursue beauty, an idea 
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that, like Levinas, identifies this beauty, and its flavour of transcendent 
infinitude, in the sacredness shining through the Other’s visage, and an idea 
that, like Balthasar, conceives such communication with transcendence as 
truthful, good, and beautiful revelation of being.
 If this idea of humanity is embraced, then Lokeria Aciro’s maimed 
visage must be interpreted as de-facement of being, as trace of the presence 
of evil in the world and history, as scripture of a negative force that thwarts 
any possibility of spiritual life, denies any humanity of the Other’s visage, 
and transforms it from transparency of infinitude into opaqueness of abyss. 
Yet, Pareyson was right in stressing the need to distinguish evil itself, 
i. e., guilt and sin, from suffering. According to Pareyson, evil cannot be 
constructive: even if taken to the extreme, it does not lead, with dialectic 
necessity, to positivity through reversal. Evil is, in itself, devastating and 
ruinous: its power is great, but only destructive. The only force superior to 
the immense force of evil is suffering. The power of evil is great, but the 
power of pain is greater. Pareyson defines it as the hidden energy of the 
world, the only one able to confront any destructive tendency and defeat 
the lethal effects of evil. He speaks about the algebra of suffering: human 
freedom has brought about evil, and evil has brought about suffering, yet 
these two negativities have generated a positivity (Pareyson, 1995).
 But how is it possible to conceive this positivity, after seeing the de-
faced face of Lokeria Aciro? Developing a characteristic trend of Catholic 
theology, Pareyson suggests that the power of pain does not only consist 
in expiation and occasion for redemption, but in the fact that suffering, 
aware of its redemptive value, also becomes revelation: it opens the painful 
heart of reality and unveils the secret of being. But where does the power 
of pain come from, and what secret does it reveal? In his answer to these 
questions, Pareyson stresses that God himself suffers; that suffering is 
actually characteristic of God; that God wants to suffer and begins to suffer 
from creation, where he withdraws into himself and voluntarily limits 
and restricts himself in order to give space to a free humanity. Suffering 
therefore is the place of utmost solidarity between God and humanity, and 
only in suffering God and humanity can join their efforts.8
8 On this aspect of Pareyson’s philosophy, cf. Di Napoli, 2000; Ghisleri, 2003; 
Sgrec cia, 2006; Stevenazzi, 2006.
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Conclusion: Absolute and Empathy
Pareyson’s thoughts clearly stem from a specific religious culture and a 
personal interpretation of its theological tradition. Yet, Pareyson’s ideas, as 
well as those of Levinas and Balthasar, partially transcend any particular 
faith and develop a poetic theological discourse about the meaning of 
humanity. It is on the basis of this discourse, where theological meditation 
on infinitude and transcendence meets aesthetical consideration for finitude 
and immanence, that the absolute can be en-visaged, that a human visage can 
be given to the idea of the absolute and that the idea of the absolute can be 
discovered in a human visage. Even more fundamentally, it is on the basis of 
this aesthetic-theological discourse that the absolute can be discovered in a 
face that evil has tried to de-face, to hide under a façade of ugliness, to push 
into the abyss of non-being and inhumanity. Finally, it is on the basis of this 
aesthetic-theological discourse that one can reject not only the an-aesthetics 
but also the anaesthesia of evil, fights against one’s own acquiescence to it, 
and seeing the suffering face of the Other as the truthful revelation of the 
absolute, as the most precious occasion of communion with transcendence, 
and as a call for truth, goodness, and beauty.
 This, I believe, is the answer to the fourth question: the absolute does 
not await us behind a veil of maya, but in the visage of another human be-
ing in pain.
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